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THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
THE PERNICIOUS CAREER OF THE INCHOATE AND
GENERAL LIEN
FRANK R. KENNEDY'
EvERY person within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government has an
enforceable obligation to make his appointed contribution to its support. But
enforcement of the Government's claims is frequently complicated when there
are other deserving creditors of the delinquent debtor, and the debtor's prop-
erty is insufficient to satisfy all claims. Government claims are accorded
preference' over claims of other creditors primarily by two statutory pro-
visions.2 Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes 3 grants a first priority to the
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This article is a revision of a thesis submitted in 1953 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Yale University Law
School. The basic conclusions herein were reached before the writer participated in the
presentation of the respondent's case in United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954),
which is discussed at several points in the article.
1. "The right of priority of payment of debts due to the Government, is a pcrogative
[sic] of the crown well lmown to the common law." United States v. State Bani: of
North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 35 (U.S. 1832). But, there being no federal common law and
the Government of the United States being one of delegated powers, it was necessary for
Congress to accord whatever priority the United States may claim by statute. l id.
Although sovereign prerogatives were in disrepute when the federal priority statute ,as
enacted, it is at least arguable that under recent Supreme Court interpretations, the United
States today has a statutory right of priority which exceeds the crown qrervgative recog-
nized by the English common law of 1789. Comp are Rorke v. Dayrell, 4 Durn. & F.
402, 100 Eng. Rep. 1087 (K.B. 1791) (sustaining priority of senior executi.n) uith United
States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (19541 ("Congress has protected the federal
revenues by imposing an absolute priority"). See also Seligson, Ban!ruptcy, 1950 Az:zu.u.T
SuRVEY OF AmicA-z LAw 476-77 (1951). The common law prerogative right to prior-
ity has always been understood in this country to be subject to prior liens as well as
transfers of title by the debtor before the priority attached. Marshall v. New Yorl:, 254
U.S. 380, 382, 384 (1920); Montgomery v. State, 228 Ala. 296, 293, 153 So. 394, 39G
(1934).
2. The Government also is granted special liens for certain taxes. See statutes cited
in note 93 infra.
3. "Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the
estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insuffi-
cient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall
be first satisfied; and the priority established shall ex\tend as well to cases in which a
debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment
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Government as a creditor; Internal Revenue Code Section 3670 4 creates a
lien on "all the property" of a delinquent taxpayer. The Section 3466 priority
is not a lien ;5 it covers all debts to the Government; it is available only in
the case of an insolvent debtor whose property has passed to a third person 0-.
other than a trustee in bankruptcy 7-for the benefit of creditors; and it arises
at the time of this transfer.8 The Section 3670 tax lien covers only tax debts;
thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor
are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31. U.S.C. § 191 (1946).
4. "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to
such tax, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien
in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person." INT. REV. CODE § 3670.
The tax lien statute appears in the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as §§ 6321-
3, H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
5. See note 18 infra.
6. Section 3466 appears to contemplate a right of priority in any case where the
debtor of the United States is insolvent. But the four cases particularly named-the
decedent's estate, the voluntary assignment, the attachment of the estate of an absent
debtor, and the commission of an act of bankruptcy-have been held to be exclusive of the
situations in which § 3466 operates. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73, 91 (U.S. 1805) ;
United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 260 (1923). And, since the following section
subjects "any executor, administrator, or assignees, or other person" to personal liability
for failing to pay the claim of the United States first, the Supreme Court has inferred that
the debtor's property must pass to some other person for the statute to apply. Bramwell
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926). The estate does so pass
at the death of an insolvent debtor or a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.
The burden is on the Government to show that a partial assignment is in fact a voluntary
assignment within the statute. United States v. Langton, 26 Fed. Gas. 862, 864, No.
15,560 (C.C.D. Mass. 1829). The provision for priority in the event of an attachment of
"the estate ... of an absconding, concealed or absent debtor" presented no anomaly, inas-
much as such an attachment under the contemporaneous statutes of important commercial
states caused an administration for the benefit of all creditors. United States v. Wilkin-
son, 28 Fed. Cas. 605, No. 16,695 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1878); McLean v. Rankin, 3 Johns.
369, 372 (N.Y. 1808).
7. Although the fourth ground for invoking § 3466 is the commission of an "act of
bankruptcy," the section now has only limited application in bankruptcy proceedings be-
cause the Bankruptcy Act prescribes its own priorities. 3 COLLIER, BAN IRUPTCY f 64.502
(14th ed. 1941). But if an act of bankruptcy is committed without the eventuation of
proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, the section will apply. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v.
Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 367-70 (1946). And the section may be applicable in reorganiza-
tion proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. See 5 COLLIER, BANKRUITCY 77.21 (14th
ed. 1943) ; 6 id. 19.13[2] (14th ed. 1.947).
8. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 617 n.8, 626 et seq. (1948) ; Engel-
man v. Commodity Credit Corp., 107 F. Supp. 930, 932 (S.D. Cal. 1952) ; State v. Wood-
roof, 253 Ala. 620, 627, 46 So.2d 553, 558 (1950). That divestment of possession and con-
trol without technical transfer of title is enough to bring the statute into operation was
settled by Bramwell v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926).
It has been held that the requirement of insolvency must be satisfied as of the time of
divestment, at least where the commission of an act of bankruptcy is relied on as a basis
for invoking § 3466. Hofmann v. United Welding & Mfg. Co., 102 A.2d 878 (Conti. 1954).
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it arises regardless of the solvency of the taxpayer; and it attaches at the
time the assessment list is received by the collector.0 Judicial interpretation
of priority and lien legislation has been misguided, resulting in a lack of har-
mony between this legislation and the Bankruptcy Act.
SECTION 3466 PRIoRITY
Section 3466 priority was apparently intended to apply only to unen-
cumbered property of the insolvent debtor. 10 If the priority is violated by the
third party liquidator, he is personally liable for the debts due the United
States." In imposing personal liability on the liquidator, Congress could
hardly have contemplated that priority payment should be made from property
subject to a mortgage or other lien, which the liquidator has no right to use
for the payment of unsecured debt claims.'- And, ordinarily, a statutory
priority prescribes only a preference among creditors having no specific
claims against property of an insolvent estate;'13 it does not apply to liens
held by competing creditors unless this application is made explicit by the
statute.' 4 Nothing in Section 3465 purports to change the traditional status
9. INT. REv. CoDE § 3671. Under § 6322 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the
lien arises from the making of the assessment rather than from the receipt of the assess-
ment list. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
10. For early statements of this understanding see Daniel Webster's argument in
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 386, 416-18 (U.S. 182a), and Mr. Justice Story's
opinion, id. at 439, 444; Case of Richardson, 9 Ops. Arfvy GE:.. 28 (1857) ; United States
v. Lewis, 26 Fed. Cas. 920, 924, No. 15,595 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1875), aff'd, 92 U.S. 618
(1875).
11. "Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who pays any debt
due by the person or estate from whom or for which he acts, before he satisfies and pays
the debts due to the United States from such person or estate, shall become answerable
in his own person and estate for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much
thereof as may remain due and unpaid." RPv. STAT. § 3467 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1946).
12. An executor or administrator takes a decedent's estate subject to liens against the
property. United States v. Cutts, 25 Fed. Cas. 745, 750, No. 14,912 (C.C.D.N.H. 1832) ;
ATKuNsoN, WmLLs 712 (2d ed. 1953); cf. Simtrs & B.tsY, Pno.s&s =: PnoBATn Lxv
151 (1946). The assignee in a voluntary assignment takes subject to all e.-isting liens.
See Bupmni, AssIGNarn,=Ts § 349 (6th ed. 1894). A receiver takes subject to existing
liens. 'Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 320, 3R5 (1920) ; Regan v. Metropolitan Haulage
Co., Inc., 127 N.J. Eq. 487, 490, 14 A.2d 257, 258-9 (CL. 1940) ; I Cwmz, REcs-,nns 932
(2d ed. 1929).
For other cases limiting the operation of § 3466 to assets subject to the liquidator's dis-
positive power to pay debts, see, e.g., Kennebec oBox Co. v. 0. S. Richards Corp., 5 F2d
951 (2d Cir. 1925); United States v. Eggleston, 25 Fed. Cas. 979, No. 15,027 (C.C.D.
Ore. 1877) ; In re Holmes Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 239 (D. Conn. 1927) ; Pustmaster Gen-
eral v. Robbins, 19 Fed. Cas. 1126, No. 11,314 (D. Me. 1829); Meyer Estate, 159 Pa.
Super. 296, 48 A2d 210 (1946) ; Estate of Jones, 84 Pa. Super. 170 (1924).
13. GLEN-, LIQUmIATION 726 (1935).
14. See Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380, 384 (1920) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Lovell, 108 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D. Miss. 1952); In re Cramond, 145 Fed. 9t, 978 (N.D.
1954]
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of secured creditors by authorizing a liquidator to override a valid lien ante-
dating the attachment of the federal priority.1'
Relative Priority of Section 3466: The Early Cases
By the middle of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court had decided
six times that the federal priority did not overcome an antecedent lien.1 The
Court refused to interpret a secret and retroactive lien into the priority
statute. 17 Section 3466 did not create a lien,' 8 nor did it create a "preference
in the nature of a lien" with power to avoid a deed of trust previously exe-
cuted to secure a guarantor. 10 Nevertheless, two early cases caused confusion
as to the viability of a pre-existing lien against 3466 priority.
In Thelusson v. Smith,20 the Supreme Court purported to rule that the
priority statute defeated the "preference" of a judgment creditor holding a
lien on the debtor's realty at the time of a voluntary assignment by the debtor.
The Government obtained a judgment against the debtor on duty bonds fall-
ing due after the assignment, and had the debtor's real estate levied upon and
sold. The judgment creditor, relying on his prior lien, brought suit to satisfy
his judgment from the proceeds of the sale. Although the Court conceded
that the 3466 priority would not defeat an antedating mortgage or fien facias
seizure, it held that the interest of a judgment lienor was overcome.
N.Y. 1906); Regan v. Metropolitan Haulage Co., Inc., 127 N.J. Eq. 487, 490-1, 14 A,2d
257, 258-9 (Ch. 1940) ; GLENN, LIQUIDATION §§ 510, 518 (1935).
A statute which purports to create a lien in behalf of a particular creditor or class of
creditors at the inception of liquidation proceedings is properly regarded as no more than
priority legislation. Id. at 726. Accordingly a state-created lien which arises from the
same circumstances as those generating a priority for the United States under § 3466
yields to the latter under the doctrine of federal supremacy. United States v. Division of
Labor Law Enforcement, 201 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Leggett v. Southeastern People's
College, 234 N.C. 595, 68 S.E.2d 263 (1951); cf. United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544
(1936), discussed note 50 infra.
15. See United States v. Eggleston, 25 Fed. Cas. 979, 981, No. 15,027 (C.C.D. Ore.
1877).
16. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U.S. 1805); Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co.,
1 Pet. 386 (U.S. 1828); Conard v. Nicoll, 4 Pet. 291 (U.S. 1830); Conard v. Pacific
Ins. Co., 6 Pet. 262 (U.S. 1832) ; United States v. Hack, 8 Pet. 271 (U.S. 1834) ; Brent
v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. 596 (U.S. 1836). See also Prince v. Bartlett, 8 Cranch
431 (U.S. 1814) ; Field v. United States, 9 Pet. 182 (U.S. 1835).
17. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73, 90 (U.S. 1805). The subversion of com-
mercial transactions wrought by secret liens and liens which operate retroactively by
relation back is recognized by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 50 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1931) ; First Nat. Bank v. Southland Prod. Co., 189 Okla.
9, 17, 112 P.2d 1087, 1095 (1941).
18. See United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 390, 394 (U.S. 1805). Recently, a
court, taking cognizance of more recent views of the section, observed that "[tihis priority
of payment accorded is not technically a 'lien' but is analogous and tantamount there-
to . . . ." Meyer Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 299, 48 A.2d 210, 212 (1946).
19. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U.S. 1805).
20. 2 Wheat. 396 (U.S. 1817).
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If Thelusson appeared to elevate 3466 priority over an antedating lien, this
notion was soon corrected by the Court. In Conard v. 4tlantic Insurance
Co.,2 1 the Court insisted that since the judgment creditor in Thelzesson had
not "perfected his title, by an execution and levy," he acquired no title to
the proceeds of the sale of the realty,22 and that Thelusson did not hold that
"a specific and perfected lien can be displaced by the mere priority of the
United States.
'2 3
While clarifying Thelusson, however, the opinion in Conard laid the foun-
dation for a new misconception of the status of a prior lien. Conard upheld
an insurance company's claim against goods at sea which, under respondenlia
bonds,2 4 were collateral security for a loan. The debtor made a general assign-
21. 1 Pet. 386 (U.S. 1328). Four pages of Conard are devoted to e-xplaining what
the Court understood the three page opinion of Thhisson to hold. The opinion in The-
hisson, written by Mr. Justice Washington, was substantially the same as one he had
originally delivered in the circuit court as a circuit justice. 23 Fed. Cas. 903, No. 13,878
(C.C.D. Pa. 1815). Washington thus appears not merely to have participated in the re-
view of his own decision but to have written the opinion affirming it.
22. Conard i. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 444 (U.S. 18M). The judgment
creditor apparently had mistaken his remedy in seeking the proceeds of the execution sale
rather than in pursuing the land. Cf. United States v. Duncan, 25 Fed Cas. 927, 932-3,
935, No. 15,003 (C.C.D. IlL 1850).
23. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 444 (U.S. 1828).
One of the justices concurring in Thelusson refused to accept the Court's e.'planation.
Mr. Justice Johnson expressed his belief that the "report of the decision" had been over-
turned on the point supposed to be decided by it, "to wit, the precedence of the debt of
the United States, as to a pre-zions judgnent, in the case of a general assignm:ent." Id. at
451. Johnson explained his own concurrence on the ground that, while the sale of the
assigned property on the Government's execution was a nullity, the plaintiff judgment
creditor had no right against the defendant marshal, there being want of privity between
the parties. Id. at 454.
Contrary to a suggestion in United States v. Duncan, 25 Fed. Cas. 927, 932, No.
15,003 (C.C.D. Ill. 1850), applicable state la, at the time of Thehlsson seems to have
been quite clear that the assignee could not have sold the real estate free of the judgment
lien without consent of the lienor. Shunk's Appeal, 2 Barr. 304 (Pa. 1845); Estate of
Gump, 13 Phila. 495 (Pa. C.P. 1876). Unless the assignee could somehow have acquired
an interest in the assignor's property superior to the judgment lien, it is not perceived
how the federal priority could have defeated the lien.
The Court's explanation of Thelhsson wras accepted by lower courts. See Cottrell v.
Pierson, 12 Fed. 805, 807 (C.C.D. Neb. 1831) ; United States v. Duncan, 25 Fed. Cas.
927, 935-6, No. 15,003 (C.C.D. Ill. 1850) ; Postmaster General v. Robbins, 19 Fed. Cas.
1126, 1127, No. 11,314 (D. Me. 1829); Case of Richardson, 9 Ops. ATr'v Gi&:. 2 , , 29
(1857) ; 1 KNT, COMtENTARIES 246-7 (2d ed. 1,32). Willing v. Bleeker, 2 S. & R. 221
(Pa. 1816), permitting the federal priority to supersede a prior garnishment, relied large-
ly on the unexplained ruling in Thelusson. Cf. Wilcocks v. Wain, 10 S. & R. 3 0 (Pa.
1823).
24. A respondentia bond is an obligation to repay a loan uf miney, on maritime in-
terest, on goods laden on board a ship, upon the condition that the goods not be lost in the
course of the voyage by any of the perils enumerated in the contract. The money is gen-
erally lent on the personal responsibility of the borruwer unless the parties cuntract, as
they did in the Conard case, for security. See 3 Borvinm, LAw DwroNAny 2922 (Rawle's
3d rev. 1914).
1954]
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ment for the benefit of creditors while the goods were at sea, and thereafter
confessed judgment on a debt to the Government. The Government levied
on the goods before the insurance company took possession, but the Court
sustained the bond security as a kind of mortgage-a "transfer in presonli"
of the "specific interest" in the goods at sea.25 The opinion emphasized that
a mortgage was more than a lien because it involved a transfer of property
as security for a debt.26 This rationale has led to the citing of Conard sub-
sequently for the proposition that the Supreme Court has never decided
whether the priority of the United States can be overcome by a specific and
perfected lien.27 This is a misconception of the decision in Conard: notwith-
standing the Court's mortgage rationale, the insurance company had nothing
more than an equitable lien, resting on the debtor's obligation to transfer the
bills of lading and goods as collateral security for a contingent debt.28
At first, the full import of Conard was appreciated by bench and bar. Six
years after the decision the Attorney General conceded the holding of Conard
to be that "the priority of the United States does not divest anterior liens."29
And in United States v. Hack 30 the Court held that assignees of partnership
property for the benefit of creditors need not grant priority to a Government
claim against one of the partners as an individual. At common law each
partner has an equitable lien on partnership property to have it applied to
firm debts, and firm creditors are subrogated to the equity of the partners.8 1
25. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 446 (U.S. 1828).
26. Id. at 441.
27. The first version of this disparagement of the Conard case appeared in United
States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 484 (1941). Three times since, the Court has reiterated
the proposition that it has never decided the question thought to have been reserved in
Conard: United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 355 (1945);
Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370 (1946) ; United States v. Gilbert
Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 365 (1953).
28. The outward bills of lading designated the borrower as the shipper, specified that
the shipments were for his account and risk, and named a third party or his assigns as
consignee. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 393 (U.S. 1828). On the out-
ward bills of lading there were endorsed assignments, which purported to transfer to the
insurance company the bills, the goods to be procured thereon, and any return cargo to
be obtained by the outward cargo. But these assignments failed to effectuate a perfected
transfer of legal title to the goods which were eventually attached by the Government:
(1) the assignments were made explicitly for the purpose of furnishing collateral security
for the contingent obligation of respondentia bonds; (2) the assignment was executed by
the borrower-shipper, not the designated consignee; and (3) the goods attached were sub-
ject to homeward bills of lading disclosing no interest on the part of the insurance com-
pany. The Court acknowledged that the assignments were imperfect as against bona fide
purchasers from the consignees for valuable consideration but insisted that they were
good as against creditors of the assignor. Id. at 445.
29. United States v. Hack, 8 Pet. 271, 273 (U.S. 1834).
30. 8 Pet. 271 (U.S. 1834).
31. Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 U.S. 648, 654-5 (1882); Case v. Beauregard, 99
U.S. 119, 125 (1878); Richardson, Creditors' Rights and the Partnership, 40 Ky. L.J.
243, 254-5 (1952) ; Note, 27 CoL. L. Rxv. 436, 437, 441 (1927).
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Hack is thus another recognition of the superiority of an antedating equitable
lien over the priority claim of the United States.
In Brent v. Bank of Washington 32 a unanimous Court squarely held that
a prior lien is not defeated by the federal priority. The executors of an in-
solvent testator, in order to accord priority to a debt due to the United
States, sought an equity, decree freeing testator's bank stock from any lien
held by the bank. The bank's lien arose from three notes endorsed by the
testator. Two of the notes fell due and were protested before the testator's
death; the Court treated "the legal lien of the bank for their payment com-
plete."33 Since the third note did not mature until after his death, a legal lien
was not consummated before the 3466 priority attached.34 Nevertheless, the
Court had no difficulty in holding for the bank on all three notes.35
Genesis and Growth of the Doctrine of the Inchoate and General Licn
Spokane County v. United Statcs 3o marked a departure from the settled
interpretation of Section 3466,37 and launched the doctrine of the inchoate
and general lien: the federal priority defeats an antedating lien that is not
specific and perfected. In Spokane County the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the state supreme court 3 s that the federal priority was superior
to a local tax lien. Two counties had assessed taxes against the debtor's per-
sonal property both before and after he went into receivership, at which time
32. 10 Pet. 596 (U.S. 1336).
33. Brent v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. 596, 615 (U.S. 1836).
34. The Court observed that the testator-stockholder's "signature to the note is an
inchoate pledge of his stock for security." Ibid.
35. "[T]he bank, when called into a court of equity, may hold to any equitable lien,
or other means in their hands, till it is discharged." Id. at 617. Cf. United States v. Cutts,
25 Fed. Cas. 745, No. 14,912 (C.C.D.N.H. 1332).
36. 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
37. The early Supreme Court cases cited note 16 supra, upholding antedating liens
over the federal priority, were followed for over a century by federal and state courts.
United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533, 537 (Sth Cir. 1929), aff'd on other
grounds, 230 U.S. 478 (1930) (mortgages and equitable liens preferred to § 3466 priority) ;
Cottrell v. Pierson, 12 Fed. S05, 806-7 (C.C.D. Neb. 18Sf.) (sustaining a judgment lien
against federal priority); United States v. Cutts, 25 Fed. Cas. 745, No. 14,912 (C.C.D.
N.H. 1832) (equitable assignment of stock as collateral security); United States v.
Crookshank, 1 Edw. Ch. 232 (N.Y. 1831) (equitable lien on realty). Cf. Piedmont Corp.
v. Gainesville & NAV.R.R., 30 F.2d 525 (N.D. Ga. 1929); In re C. J. Rowe & Bros.,
Inc., 18 F.2d 658 (W.D. Pa. 1927); United States v. Wilkinson, 2S Fed. Cas. 605, No.
16,695 (W.D. Mo. 1878) (sustaining title of attaching creditor who purchased at own
sale all of property of absconding debtor of United States) ; Postmaster General v. Rob-
bins, 19 Fed. Cas. 1126, No. 11,314 (D. Mie. 1329) (sustaining widow's allowance not-
withstanding uncertainty as to the amount). See Brown v. American Gas Coal Co., 95
NV. Va. 658, 665, 123 S.E. 412, 415 (1924); Case of Richardson, 9 OPs. ;WfTx Gz:u. 23
(1857). For further confirmation of the uniform understanding of the meaning of the
early Supreme Court precedents, see 5 CoLLER, BA-xrRTPrCy 546 nA5 (14th ed. 1943);
65 C.J. 1369 n. 37, 40 (1933); 39 Cyc. 751 n.1 (1912).
38. Exchange Nat. Bank v. United States, 147 Wash. 176, 265 Pac. 722 (1928).
1954]
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the federal priority attached. The state supreme court had previously held
that the personal property tax created a binding lien only on specific property
against which it was assessed.39 Chief Justice Taft assumed that no property
in the hands of the receiver had been assessed by the counties until after the
federal priority arose. 4° With this crucial assumption of fact made, the coun-
ties were merely unsecured creditors. In affirming the Government's priority
over unsecured claims, Spokane County squared with existing law.41 Had
the factual assumption and its significance, however, been made more explicit,
the decision might have been better understood and productive of less mis-
chief.42 But the Court's emphasis on the fact that the counties' liens were
not "specific" and not "completed" by distraint,48 inauspiciously originated the
doctrine of the inchoate and general lien. The Court did not differentiate the
Conard, Hack, and Brent cases. Indeed, Chief Justice Taft seemed to be
oblivious of their existence.
44
Once born, the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien was nurtured in
subsequent Court decisions. In New York v. Maclay,45 the State of New
York claimed a lien for franchise taxes on the property of a corporation in
receivership. Although the lien, under New York law, bound the property
in the hands of subsequent purchasers and took precedence over prior as well
39. Pennington v. Yakima County, 127 Wash. 538, 221 Pac. 326 (1923) ; Raymond
v. King County, 117 Wash. 343, 201 Pac. 455 (1921).
40. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 93 (1929). This assumption
ignores the statement in the dissenting opinion in the court below that the proceeds of
the sales of the taxpayer's assets by the receiver stood "in lieu of the specific property
assessed, and the lien of the county tax . . . extended to it." Exchange Nat. Bank v.
United States, 147 Wash. 176, 188, 265 Pac. 722, 726 (1928). The Court also ignored
the county's contention that its lien on the property taxed was transferred from the specific
items sold to the fund in the hands of the receiver. Spokane County v. United States,
supra at 80.
41, The 3466 priority outranks a state's unsecured claims. United States v. San Juan
County, 280 Fed. 120 (W.D. Wash. 1922); In re Dickson's Estate, 197 Wash. 145, 8
P.2d 661 (1938). In Ernst v. Guarantee Millwork, Inc., 200 Wash. 195, 93 P.2d 404
(1939), the Washington court, appropriately distinguishing Spokane Cowuny, sustained a
state personal property tax lien on the specific property assessed (actually the proceeds
of its sale) as against the claim of the Government for priority.
42. See Ernst v. Guarantee Millwork, Inc., supra note 41; United States v. Waddill,
Holland & Flinn, Inc., 182 Va. 351, 358, 364, 28 S.E.2d 741, 743, 746 (1944), rev'd, 323
U.S. 353 (1945).
43. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 94-5 (1929). While Chief Justice
Taft referred to the counties' liens as not specific and not perfected, he quoted from the
concurring opinion of Judge Parker of the Washington Supreme Court, who rested his
decision on the absence of any supporting lien right. 147 Wash. at 187, 265 Pac. at 725-6.
44. After discussing United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358 (U.S. 1805), and United
States v. Nicholls, 4 Yeates 251 (Pa. 1805), writ of error dism'd, 4 Wheat. 311 (U.S.
1819), Taft wrote: "No question of the construction of § 3466 seems to have come before
this Court again until . . . Field v. United States, 9 Pet. 182 [ (1835)] . . ." Spokane
County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 89 (1929). This ignores, inter alia, the Conard
cases decided in 1828-32. See note 16 supra. Neither they nor the Brent case, decided the
year after Field, was cited by the Court despite their obvious relevance.
45. 288 U.S. 290 (1933).
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as subsequent mortgages,46 the state taxes had not been assessed or liquidated
until after the receivers were appointed and the federal priority attached.
Therefore, invoking Spokanc County, the Supreme Court held that New
York's lien was not specific and perfected 47 and that the federal claim must
be accorded priority.
To his conclusions in Ne'w York v. Maclay, Mr. Justice Cardozo appended
a mischief-making paragraph, containing the gratuitous suggestion that the
result might have been ihe same even if the state tax lien had become specific
and perfected by liquidation before the priority attached.4 s In support of this
suggestion he raised the ghost of Thelusson: federal priority will prevail over
a lien which has not resulted in a "change of title or possession."4 0 To
Cardozo, the federal priority "must prevail against the [New York] lien of a
tax not presently enforcible, but serving merely as a caveat of a more perfect
lien to come."' o
In United States v. Texas 1 the doctrine of the general and inchoate lien
was extended to embrace a tax lien which, under state law, was "first and
46. See New York Terminal Co. v. Gaus, 204 N.Y. 512, 98 N.E. 11 (1912).
47. New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 292-3 (1933).
48. Id. at 293. The suggestion was heeded in Gerson, Beesley & Hampton, Inc. v.
Shubert Theatre Corp., 7 F. Supp. 399, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), and Matter of Lincoln
Chair & Novelty Co., 274 N.Y. 353, 9 N.E.2d 7 (1937).
49. New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 293-4 (1933). Circuit Judge Augustus Hand
had raised the ghost in the opinion below. New York Y. 'Maclay, 59 F2d 979, 931 (2d
Cir. 1932). Cardozo's analysis followed closely that of Hand.
50. New York v. Maclay, 28 U.S. 290, 294 (1933).
Although the doctrine of the inchoate lien also received recognition in United States
v. Knott, 293 U.S. 544 (1936), the decision can stand without it. The case involved the
right of the United States to assert priority in the proceeds of a deposit made by a -ew
Jersey surety company as security for the payment of judgments on its himnds in Florida.
The proceeds of the deposit were being administered in a state receivership proceeding
for the benefit of unsecured creditors including some whose claims had no connection with
surety bonds. When the federal priority attached, no Florida claimant had a judgment,
a claim of lien, or any specific interest in the deposit. The Government had 6btaincd
judgment against the surety company on bonds given in Florida, and had filed a claim
for the aggregate amount in a state receivership proceeding. The Florida Supreme Court
subordinated the Government to Florida claimants. Kelly v. Knott, 120 Fla. 580, 163 So.
64 (1935). In view of the fact that the securities deposited remained subject to prozeis
within the state, at least prior to insolvency, and that the deposit vas subject to adminis-
tration for the benefit of unsecured creditors when insolvency occurred, the decision of the
United States Supreme Court sustaining the Government's claim to priority over the other
creditors is difficult to criticize. But cf. Conway v. Imperial Life Insurance Co., 207 La.
285, 21 So.2d 151 (1945). 'Mr. Justice Brandeis' conclusion in Knott that the Florida
creditors' interest lacked "the characteristics of a specific perfected lien which alone bars
the priority of the United States" was found ten years later to concede tco much. By
then the federal priority had waxed in stature and the Court explained away the con-
cession in order to keep open the question whether a specific and perfected lien wuld
bar the priority. "The statement . . . was not intended to settle the problem and may
be taken to have been made with reference to the early mortgage lien cases ... ." IllinciL
ex rel Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370 n.10 (1946).
51. 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
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prior to any and all other existing liens."'5 2 The Texas court held that such a
lien for state gasoline taxes, on all the propetty used in the business of a
gasoline distributor, outranked both a prior mortgage and a priority claim
for federal gasoline taxes. 3 The Supreme Court reversed because the state's
lien was not sufficiently specific and perfected to prevail against the federal
priority: the property subject to the lien was "neither specific nor constant" ;54
the amount of the claim secured by the lien was "unliquidated and uncertain" ;6
and some judicial procedure was essential to enforce the lien.50
52. TEx. STAT., REV. Civ., art. 7065a-7 (1936).
53. State v. Nix, 138 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), entering judgment in con-
formity with answers to questions certified to the Supreme Court of Texas, 134 Tex. 476,
133 S.W.2d 963 (1939) ; see also State v. Wynne, 134 Tex. 455, 133 S.W.2d 951 (1939),
app. disn'd, 310 U.S. 610 (1940).
54. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 487 (1.941). It is not unusual for a mort-
gage to cover accessions, after-acquired property, or even a shifting stock of goods. 3
GLENN, MORTGAGES c. 33 (1943). Such mortgages apparently would not satisfy the Texas
test.
55. The Court thought the amount uncertain because a statute made tax reports by
the distributor only prima fade evidence of the amount of the tax and authorized admis-
sion of evidence of incorrectness of the report. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480,
487 (1941). Is any lien so certain that neither party can show in a judicial proceeding the
incorrectness of the amount secured? In First Nat. Bank v. Southland Production Co.,
189 Okla. 9, 112 P.2d 1087 (1941), the Government attacked a ruling conferring priority
on a state tax lien on the ground that the lien was not perfect and specific when the
federal priority attached. Levy had been made under a warrant to enforce the state lien
prior to the institution of the insolvency proceedings against the taxpayer, but the state
later discovered that $656.72 was due from the taxpayer in addition to that previously
reported by him. The court sustained the priority of the state tax lien even as to the
latter sum.
The amount secured is frequently unliquidated and uncertain, as when the mortgage is
one for future advances or contains a dragnet clause. See, e.g., the deed of trust sustained
as against the federal claim to priority in United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U.S.
1805). And of course there is always the possibility of disagreement as to the amount
or application of payments. 2 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE c. 33 (5th ed. 1939).
56. "[The lien] ...did not of its own force divest the taxpayer of either title or
possession." United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 488 (1941). In states where a mort-
gage may be foreclosed only by judicial proceedings the modern mortgage often has the
characteristics of the "inchoate and general" lien held by the state in Texas; it does not
of its own force divest title or possession. See Bank of Wrangell v. Alaska Asiatic
Lumber Mills, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D. Alaska 1949) ; Meyer Estate, 159 Pa. Super.
296, 302, 48 A.2d 210, 214 (1946). Real estate mortgages in particular are apt to be sub-
ject to a requirement that enforcement shall be accomplished by judicial foreclosure.
OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 921 (1951).
"Incredible as it may seem, the question whether a mortgage lien is entitled to priority
over the United States under this statute has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court."
Bank of Wrangell v. Alaska Asiatic Lumber Mills, Inc., supra at 2. Presented with the
question, the Alaska court acknowledged that recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt
on the ability of a mortgage to defeat the federal priority, but it sustained the mortgage.
See United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 1929), aff'd on other
grounds, 280 U.S. 478 (1930). The latest expression of the Supreme Court on the nature
of a mortgage recognizes its specific character but does not advert to its state of per-
fection. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954).
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The opinion in Texas undermines the interpretation of 3466 established by
the early cases. After observing that 3466 mentions no exception to its re-
quirement of first satisfaction of debts due to the Government, the opinion
noted that in Thelusson, Conard, and Brent the Court had created an ex-
ception for previously executed mortgages.57 The Court then remarked that
these so-called "mortgage cases" had reserved the question of whether the
federal priority would be defeated by a specific and perfected ien.ts This
statement ignores the actual decisions in Conard and Brent, and rests on an
apparent acceptance of Cardozo's analysis of Thelusson. These "mortgage
cases" were then disposed of with an observation that, "whatever [their]
current vitality, [they did not] require the subordination of unsecured claims
of the United States to a specific and perfected lien."' ' O An impressive body
of authority requiring such subordination was thus reduced to a trio of mis-
understood cases shadowed by a cloud of doubt.
In order to continue the expansion of the doctrine of the inchoate and
general lien, the Supreme Court soon found it necessary to rule that specificity
and perfection is a federal question. In United States v'. J'addill, Holland &
Flinn, Inc.,60 Virginia's highest court had held that a statutory landlord's
lien was "fixed and specific and not ... merely ... inchoate.'" The Supreme
Court could not deny this as an authoritative construction of state law; and
it had said in Spokane County that "[tihis is really a state question."0 2 The
Court, however, restated the role of state law in the determination of the
relative priority of the competing claims:
".. . [I]t is a matter of federal law as to whether a lien created by
state statute is sufficiently specific and perfected to raise questions
as to the applicability of the priority given the claims of the United
States by an act of Congress. '63
57. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 484 (1941). Cf. Bank of Wrangell v.
Alaska Asiatic Lumber Mills, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Alaska 1949).
58. It is the argument of this article that the security interest involved in Co:ard was
certainly no more than a specific lien. Mr. Justice Baldwin in the Brent case said that
the Conard security transaction "appro.ximates to one which merely gives a lien" Brent
v. Bank of Washington, 10 Pet. 596, 611 (U.S. 1836). Since the Brcw case did recog-
nize that legal and equitable liens were superior to the federal priority, see note 35 supra,
it is inconceivable that Baldwin thought that the question of whether the federal priority
would be defeated by "a specific and perfected lien" was reserved in either Con:ard or
Brent. His words were that "it has never been decided that it [i.e., the federal priority]
affects any lien, general or specific, existing when the event took place which gave the
United States a claim of priority." Id. at 611. In the context of the Cozard and Brc;.i
decisions, Baldwin's words must mean not that the question had been reserved but that
the court had never decided for the Government.
59. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 486 (1941).
60. 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
61. United States v. Vaddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 182 Va. 351, 363, 23 S.E2d 741,
746 (1944).
62. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. SO, 94 (1929) ; accord, United States
v. Reese, 131 F.2d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1942).
63. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 355-7 (1945).
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Scrutinized under federal law the landlord's lien failed to meet federal
standards of specificity and perfection. 4 The Court said it was not known
on the day the federal priority attached whether the landlord would assert
his lien.05 The amount of the rent claim secured by the lien was deemed un-
certain in view of the possibility of prior payment or mistake or a right of
setoff in the tenant. 6 The property subject to the lien was said to be in-
definite because the landlord's lien could not be enforced against more prop-
erty than necessary to satisfy the rent claim, 67 and could not be asserted
against property removed from the rented premises for more than thirty
days. 6 In addition to setting standards of specificity that few if any liens
could satisfy, the Court confused "perfection" with processes of enforcement
and collection."0 The statutory lien was held not perfected because the land-
lord had not levied on the property, and because the tenant retained both title
and possession."0
The doctrine of the inchoate lien received its fullest elaboration in Illinois
ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell,7' where constructive notice to the world provided
by recording a statutory lien was held not to affect a Section 3466 priority
claim. Under state law, the state's lien for unemployment contributions at-
tached to all of the employer's personal property used in his business7 2
64. Although the City of Danville, Virginia, was not represented in the Supreme
Court, its tax lien on personalty of the debtor was also subordinated to the federal prior-
ity. The state courts had accorded the city priority over the landlord as well as the
Government but the Supreme Court found the city's lien not sufficiently "explicit and
perfected." The Court relied strongly on an inadvertent clause in a dictum of an inferior
Virginia court for substantiation of its conclusion that the city's lien was contingent. Id.
at 359-60. The Virginia Supreme Court's clear analysis, 182 Va. at 363, 28 S.E.2d at 746,
was disregarded.
65. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 357 (194s). Of
course, up to the instant any lien is terminated by payment, there can be no absolute
certainty that the lienor will insist on his full rights under the lien. This observation is
a dramatic illustration of the length to which the Court has been willing to go to sustain
its view that a particular lien is inchoate.
66. Id. at 357-8. Is ever a lien free of this kind of uncertainty? The Court apparently
thought it unnecessary to inquire if there was in fact any dispute or uncertainty as to
the amount of the lien.
67. Id. at 358.
68. Ibid. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 5523 (1942).
69. Cf. Glenn, Creditors' Rights- A Review of Recent Developments, 32 VA. L. Rnv.
235, 289 (1946) ; 31 VA. L. REv. 678, 680-81 (1945). When Congress has used the word
"perfected" with reference to liens in the Bankruptcy Act, its reference has been to the
conventional meaning rather than the esoteric meanings found in the Supreme Court
opinions construing § 3466. See 3 COLLIER, BAN KRUPTCY ff f60.36-60.51 (14th ed. 1941) ;
4 id. 111 67.24, 67.26 (14th ed. rev. 1954) ; WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPCY LAW OF 1938
120, 144 (1938). For further evidence of conventional usage see comment 2 accompanying
§ 9-303 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Official Draft, Text and Comments ed. 1952).
70. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 358 (1945). Tie
Virginia court, however, had insisted that the landlord had the same kind of possessory
lien as an innkeeper. 182 Va. at 362, 28 S.E.2d at 745.
71. 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
72. ILL. REV. STAT., c. 48, § 243(a) (1943).
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Notice of the lien had been filed in the office of the county recorder, validating
it even against innocent purchasers for value. 3 In order to protect itself
against dissipation of its security, the state sued in a state court to enforce
the lien, and obtained both an injunction against creditors' interference with
the property, and the appointment of a receiver. The state supreme court,
however, accorded priority to a federal claim, 74 and the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed.
The lien was found not "sufficiently specific or perfected" for federal pur-
poses. Although the lienor was identified,7r, and the amount of the lien was
certain,76 the property to which the lien attached was not definite.77 The
statutory language--"all the personal property. . . used.., in business"--
was too vague and comprehensive; the property affected could not be ascer-
tained until the debtor submitted a schedule in the lien foreclosure proceed-
ings.7s In addition to this three-part test of identity, certainty, and definite-
ness the Court suggested that specificity and perfection required a transfer
of title or possession.7" The Court repudiated the view that recordation per-
fected the state lien,80 because such a view "in substance" would overrule the
73. ILL. REV. STAT., c. 43, § 243(b) (I) (1943).
74. People for use of Murphy v. Chicago Waste & Textile Co., 391 I11. 29, 0,2 X.E2d
537 (1945).
75. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946). Cf. United States
v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936), discussed in note 50 stpra.
76. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946). The Court aclmwl-
edged that the notices of lien "fixed the amounts uf the liens, though miscalculated:' lMI.
Uncertainty as to the amount secured by the lien was nevertheless fatal in New Yorl:
v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933), United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 4,0 (1941), and United
States v. "Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
77. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946). This indefiniteness
was also found in the Maclay, Texas, and Waddill cases, supra note 76.
78. The filing of a complete schedule of pers ,nal prorerty subject to the lien was a
duty of the debtor. ILT. REv. STAT., c. 48, § 243 (e) (1943). Since the state would nit
know the amount of property subject to the lien until the debtor had filed the required
schedule, the earlier appointment of the receiver was said to be "only an initial step in
the perfection of the lien, [not a final attachment,] as is, for e.-xample, the enforcement of
a judgment by execution and levy"' Illinois cx rcl. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362,
374 (1946). Cf. State v. Woodroof, 253 Ala. 620, 630, 46 So2d 553, 561 (1950), v,-here
the state court ventured its ovn version of the Supreme Court "formula or standard7
for a "specific and perfected' lien: "if the amount of it has been fixed by a proceeding
which is binding and conclusive at the date of receivership, and not open for change in
any sort of proceeding which might arise thereafter; and that the lien upon the property
which was received by the receiver was not dependent upon any contingency, nor subject
to selection, shift, or change, and nothing remained to be done then er thereafter to ma!:e
such lien complete, specific or perfect, or to liquidate the debt, and nothing could be done
thereafter to discharge the debt or subordinate such lien but full payment of the debt."
79. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 376 (1946).
80. Justices Reed and Jackson dissented on the ground that recirdation of notice
perfected the state lien. See id. at 376-8. The same justices also dissented in United
States v. Carroll Construction Co., 346 U.S. S02 (1953). Since Carroll Consirnction Co.
involved a state tax lien of which notice had been filed under state law, it may be sur-
mised that the Carroll dissenters were adhering to the position they tool: in Campbcll.
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numerous decisions in which liens no less "specific and perfected" had been
held impotent against Section 3466.81
The most recent case under Section 3466 produced the defeat of a state
lien perfected by foreclosure sale. In Petition of Gilbert Associates, 11c.,82
New Hampshire's highest court thought that there could be "no question" that
the lien of a town property tax on machinery which had been foreclosed by
advertisement and sale before the federal priority arose complied with the
Supreme Court's requirements. s5 The state court was satisfied that the town's
tax lien was sufficiently perfected and specific even before advertisement and
sale.14 The Government took the case to the Supreme Court,88 where the
town did not continue the battle. Without questioning that the lienor was
identified, that the amount of the lien was certain, or that the property subject
to the lien was definite, the Court simply pointed out that "[t]he taxpayer
had not been divested by the Town of either title or possession. The Town,
therefore, had only a general, unperfected lien."80 What made the lien "gen-
eral" is not clear.
The remarkable progeny of Spokane County subordinated statutory liens 8
to the federal claim, even though the Government had no lien. The condemned
category of the inchoate and general lien, created by the Court and contin-
ually enlarged to include each new lien coming before it, has come to embrace
practically every lien to be found in modern American law.88 And in order
to avoid facing the supposedly unresolved question whether a specific and
perfected lien is superior to the federal priority, the Court has always been
If recordation perfects a lien on a debtor's property as against every subsequently accrtuing
interest under state law, these justices are apparently unable to find anything in the federal
priority statute to justify a judicial ruling that the lien is still not perfected. Cf. Goggin
v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement of Cal., 336 U.S. 1.18 (1949), implying throughout
that a federal tax lien had been "perfected" for the purposes of § 67b of the Bankruptcy
Act by virtue of a filing of notice of the lien.
81. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 374, 376 (1946). Only Wad-
dill was cited, and that case did not involve a recorded lien.
82. 97 N.H. 411, 90 A.2d 499 (1952).
83. Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N.H. 411, 416, 90 A.2d 499, 503 (1952).
84. Ibid.
85. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
86. Id. at 366.
87. All these cases involved state statutory liens. But "[a] statutory lien is as bind-
ing as a mortgage, and has the same capacity to hold the land as long as the statute
preserves it in force." United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954), quoting
Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 177, 179 (U.S. 1827).
88. Repeated references in the Court's opinions to lack of title or possession suggest
that pledges, common-law liens, and even statutory possessory liens may meet the Court's
standards. But both title and possession may be required despite the use of the disjunc-
tive in the Court's references to these two features. In Gilbert Associates acquisition of
a tax title without possession was insufficient to perfect the lien. To speak of a lienor
with title is of course to utter a legal solecism; but the incongruities of the doctrine of
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successful in finding one feature suggestive of inchoateness." In 1954 the
Court finally acknowledged that a lien was specific and perfected. 8 But the
competing federal interest in this case was the federal tax lien, not the federal
priority. To the tax lien it is now necessary to turn.
SEcTioN 3670 TAx LIEN
Evolution of Federal Tax Lien Legislation
The need for a lien to secure the Government's tax claims, irrespective of
the taxpayer's solvency, became apparent as federal fiscal requirements e.-
the inchoate and general lien have never been a handicap to its devehpment. In any
event, even a possessory lienor probably does not hold free of all the cm-ntingencies
enumerated in Waddill. See text at notes 65-8 supra.
There is occasional intimation that an actual levy may create a specific and perfcctd
lien. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 3t2, 374 ( 14W. The sug'-
gestion apparently goes back to a dictum, that seizure under a fieri fadas places prup rty
beyond the federal priority, in Thelusson v. Smith, 2 W qeat. 396, 426 (U.S. 1817). A leiy
of execution, however, need not deprive the debtor of possession. See 2 FrrEE!t.:, Exr-
cuTioNs 263 (3d eda 1900) (personalty); DR.KxE, ATrT.%cIENT §236 (7th eJ. M91)
(realty); 2 FREEMAN., ExEcunoNs § 280a (3d ed. 1900) (same). Even when pssessi,.n
is taken by a levying officer, the lien may be defeated by intervention of bankruptcy under
§ 67a of the Bankruptcy Act or by other circumstances before final enforcciment. 2 Hi.
§§ 271-271a. Finally, the possession taken under a levy would seem to be like that of the
receiver in Campbell-possession "of the court" rather than of the liewnor. And that Idind
of possession apparently does not constitute perfection. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Camp-
bell, 329 U.S. 362, 376 (1946).
The six cases cited in note 16 supra, sustaining consensual liens, have nt bccn ex-
plicitly overruled; and no consensual lien has yet been subordinated by the Supreme
Court on the ground that it was inchoate and general. The Court has, however, intimated
that the old "mortgage cases" may now require re-examination. New Yorl: v. Maclay,
288 U.S. 290, 294 (1933) ; United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 4'0, 4S4, 486 (1941) ; Ilin,.is
ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370 (1946). But cf. United States v. New
Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86-7 (1954). As pointed out in notes 54-6 supra. the m Lcm mirt-
gage has some or all of the characteristics of the inchoate and general lien. No other
variety of consensual lien appears to be completely free of such characteristics. Thuq,
while the landlord's lien urged unsuccessfully in If'addill was statuttry, a cvntractual
landlord's lien is ordinarily vulnerable to the same infirmities.
Although nothing in the cases states that the nature of the property subject to a licn
has aught to do with the issue of whether the lien is specific and perfected, it has sme-
times been thought that a difference should be rectgnized between a lien on realty and a
lien on personalty. Cf. BAr~uPTcY AcT § 67c, discussed in 4 COLLIER, BA. A:P: cV
f[ 67.20[3] (14th ed. rev. 1954). The statutory liens involved in Macla;y and Texas ap-
parently applied to real property as well as to personalty, and the Court made no effrt
to limit the scope of its ruling to personalty in either case. The only hint that the nature
of the property may be relevant is found in United States v. New Britain, sapra at -7,
where Gilbert Associates was distinguished partly on the ground that it involved g~rz._,na1
property instead of realty. But see text at note 137 infra. For a recent application tf
the doctrine to a statutory lien on real estate see In re Lane's Estate, 59 N.W.2d 593
(Iowa 1953), 39 IowA L. REv. 189.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 3 6 (1953),
where lack of title or possession doomed an apparently otherwise choate licn.
90. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
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panded during the Civil War and tax collections were increasingly defeated
by a transfer of the taxpayer's assets before institution of enforcement pro-
ceedings. 91 Section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that if, after
demand for payment, any person should neglect or refuse to pay a federal
tax,9 2 the amount of the tax should be a lien in favor of the United States, 93
The lien attaches to "all property and rights to property . . . belonging to
such person."0 4
United States v. Snyder,9 5 the first Supreme Court case involving the
federal tax lien, demonstrated how drastic a statute had been drawn. In 1879
a federal lien for delinquent tobacco taxes attached to certain realty owned
by Charles Snyder. Snyder transferred the realty in 1881 to a good faith
purchaser for value. Four years later, the Government sued Snyder and his
transferee to enforce the lien. The circuit court dismissed the purchaser pur-
suant to a Louisiana constitutional provision which imposed a three-year
statute of limitations on any "privilege on immovable property" not recorded
in the parish where the realty was located., The Government appealed. "The
single question thus presented for [the Supreme Court's] consideration [was]
whether the tax system of the United States is subject to the recording laws
of the States."' 97 So stated, the question was not difficult to answer: the
federal lien was held valid against the transferee.
Since Snyder imposed individual hardships and impaired alienation of
91. Derivation of the tax lien statute is commonly traced to 14 STAT. 107 (1866).
See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 334 (1943). Also see Hist. note, 26
U.S.C.A. § 3670 (1940). But substantially the same statute appeared earlier in 13 STAT.
470-1 (1865).
92. A neglect or refusal to pay after demand is a condition precedent to the inception
of the lien. An ambiguity exists in the provisions for the commencement of the lien found
in §§ 3670 (time of demand) and 3671 (time of receipt of assessment list). See, e.g.,
MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540, 541-2 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Kohlmcier, Federal
Tax Liens Under Revised Statutes-Section 3186, 13 TAX MAn. 191, 192 (1935). The
result has been uniformly reached, however, that the lien arises only after both require-
ments have been satisfied. United States v. Lias, 103 F. Supp. 341, 342 (N.D.W.Va.),
aff'd, 196 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1.952) ; Johnson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 184 Misc.
728, 53 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1945). It seems clear that there should be no relation back
to cut off rights vesting in the period intervening between the first and second steps
requisite to the attachment of the tax lien. Cf. Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien
Rights in the Collection of Federal Taxes, 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 739, 745 (1947).
93. See note 4 supra. Special liens secure liability for unpaid taxes on distilled spirits,
INT. REv. CODE § 2800(e) (1); the head tax on aliens entering the United States, 22
STAT. 214 (1882), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 132 (Supp. 1952) ; the federal estate tax, INT.
REV. CODE § 827; and the gift tax, INT. REv. CODE § 1009. The statutory provisions for
special tax liens are not restricted by the provisions for the general tax lien. See Detroit
Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943) (notice-filing not required for federal estate
tax lien).
94. See note 4 supra.
95. 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
96. LA. CONsT. Art. 176 (1879).
97. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 213 (1893).
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property,98 a 1913 amendment invalidated the federal tax lien as against pur-
chasers, mortgagees, and judgment creditors prior to the filing of notice of
the lien.99 Still the statute proved inadequate for commercial necessities.
Pledgees were added to the class protected by notice-filing. °0  In United
States v. Rosen field,'°1 the collector was allowed to foreclose a tax lien on
shares of stock which had been acquired by a broker without actual notice
of the previously filed lien. The decision negated the provisions and policy
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, then adopted in half the States, insofar
as that law sought to promote negotiability of stock certificates by freeing
them of liens not indicated on the certificate. -0 2 Immediately after the Rosen-
field case a new exception was engrafted on the lien statute to protect any
mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser of a security, who did not have actual notice
93. Five years after Snyder the American Bar Association appointed a committee to
call Congress' attention to the implications of Snyder, and to urge remedial legislation.
21 A.B.A. REP. 108, 261 (1898); 22 A.B.A. RuP. 53-3, 483 (1899). Although approval
of the efforts of the committee was obtained from the Secretary of the Treasury in 1902,
25 A.B.A. RP. 496 (1902), it was another eleven years before they wvere to bear fruit.
When the American Bar Association first interested itself in the problem, the principal
taxes which would give rise to a troublesome lien appeared to be those for spirits and
tobacco. 22 A.B.A. REP. 55 (1899). By 1913, concern was developing over the impact of
a corporate excise tax levied by the Revenue Act of 1909, 36 STAT. 11 The Attorney
General had ruled that unpaid taxes imposed by that Act would constitute a lien. 23 Ops.
ATr'y Gmz. 241 (1910). Also see 37 A.B.A. REP. 41 (1912); HMR. ~re. No. 1018, 6214
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912).
99. 37 STAT. 1016 (1913). The Government has sought to have the courts read the
notice-filing statute as having the effect of subordinating to the federal tax lien every hind
of lien not specifically protected, regardless of the time of its attachment to the debtor's
property. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 19-24, United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 31
(1954) ; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 27-9, United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361
(1953). In subordinating liens attaching prior to the tax lien, this reading of the statute
involves a misapprehension of the purpose of notice-filing legislation. See H.R. REP. No.
1018, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1912). But the reading found support in the concurring-
opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S.
47, 51 (1950).
For the persons covered by the notice-filing provision, actual notice or knowledge of
a federal tax lien has been regarded as immaterial on the question of the validity of the
tax lien. United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1933). But, under
§ 6323(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, actual notice wiU be equated to con-
structive notice for mortgagees, pledgees, and purchasers. H.R. 8300, 3d Cong., 24 Sess.
(1954). No reference is made, however, to the effect of a judgment creditor's actual
knowledge.
100. 53 STAT. 882-3 (1939). This amendment apparently was declaratory ,f existing
law. H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1939) ; cf. In re Decler's Estate, 355
Pa. 331, 340-1, 49 A.2d 714, 719 (1946), cert. denied smb nomn. Decker v. Kann, 331 U.S.
807 (1947) ; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Davy, 13 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Oka. 1936). Contra:
Investment & Securities Co. v. Robbins, 49 F. Supp. 620, 622 (E.D. Wash. 1943), aff'd,
140 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1944).
101. 26 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1938).
102. UNiroRmI STocK TeMxsiR Acr §§ 1, 5, 6, 15.
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of the federal tax lien, whether or not recorded.' 03 Thus, in a series of amend-
ments during the last ninety years, Congress has exhibited a constant purpose
to protect third persons against harsh application of the federal tax lien.10 4
No more here than in Section 3466 is there any indication that Congress in-
tended the federal right to supersede an antecedent lien.
A Trio of Troublesome Precedents
The Government lawyers who, equipped with no more than a priority stat-
ute, were winning jousts with lien claimants in the lists of the Supreme Court
in the 1930's and early 1940's, found harder going in lower courts when armed
instead with a federal tax lien.' 0 5 In the late 1940's the Government forged
103. INT. REv. CODE § 3672(b), 53 STAT. 882-3 (1939). Section 6324 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 would incorporate a similar provision into the federal estate and
gift tax lien legislation. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6324 (1954).
104. In at least five of the nine amendments which have brought §§ 3670-2 to their
present form, 'Congress has concerned itself with making the statute operate more equi-
tably toward third parties: 20 STAT. 331 (1879), eliminating relation-back of the lien to
the date the tax became due; 43 STAT. 994 (1925), providing for notice-filing in records
of towns and cities in New England; 45 STAT. 875 (1928), placing a limitation on dura-
tion of the tax lien; and see notes 99, 100, and 103 supra. The other four amendnents,
48 STAT. 757 (1934), 49 STAT. 1921 (1936), 53 STAT. 448 (1939), and 56 STAT. 957 (1942),
have involved formal or procedural changes.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), overrules
several interpretations of the present lien law but marks no departure from the policy of
protecting third parties. Section 6321 subjects a taxpayer's interest in an estate by the
entirety to the lien, overruling such cases as Bigley v. Jones, 64 F. Supp. 389 (W.D. Okla.
1946), and United States v. Nathanson, 60 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mich. 1945). Section 6322
starts the lien from the time the assessment is made rather than the time the collector
receives the assessment list. Section 6323(b) nullifies state notice-filing statutes which
prescribe the form or content of the federal lien notice, e.g., Mica. STAT. ANN. § 7.751
(1950), held applicable in United States v. Maniaci, 116 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1940). An
amendment of 1942 apparently having the same purpose proved to be abortive. Young-
blood v. United States, 141 F2d 912 (6th Cir. 1944). See Wright, Title Examinations in
Michigan as Affected by the General Federal Tax Lien, 51 MicH. L. REV. 183 (1952).
Section 6323 (c) (1) validates the lien against purchasers, mortgagees, and pledgees taking
property (except securities) with actual notice of the lien. This provision overrules such
literal interpretations of the notice-filing law as that in United States v. Beaver Run Coal
Co., 99 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1938). Section 6323(c) (2) limits the protection afforded a
judgment creditor to persons with a conventional judgment, codifying United States v.
Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953). Section 6323(c) (3) further limits the class
of judgment creditors to those with perfected liens. Unless the word "perfected" takes
on the exotic coloration of the doctrine of the inchoate lien, see United States v. Security
Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950), § 6323(c) (3) will be in accord with the inter-
pretation of the'present statute, INT. Rsv. CODE § 3672. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of
America, 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948).
105. See, e.g., New York Casualty Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. I11, 1944);
Meyer Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A.2d 210 (1946). In addition to arguing for a 3670
tax lien, the Government sometimes proposed the application of § 3466 in situations in
which it was obviously inapplicable. See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. Louisville Mul.
Housing Comm'n, 63 F. Supp. 486, 487 (W.D. Ky. 1945), aff'd sub nora. Glenn v.
American Surety Co., 160 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1947) ; In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp.
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an argument which it began to test in the lower courts: "the rationale of cases
under [Section 3466] ... should be followed in determining priorities of liens
under [Section] 3670."100 This argument by analog, made no impression
until the Government carried its contest with an attaching creditor to the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sccurit , Trust & Savings Bank. 0T
In Security Bank the creditor's attachment and subsequent judgment strad-
dled the date of the federal tax lien. The Stylianos owned realty in California.
Morrison sued them on a note and had the realty attached. Thereafter, but
before Morrison obtained judgment against the Stylianos, a federal tax lien
arose against the realty, and notice was duly filed. Under California law, the
creditor's attachment gave rise to a lien on the realty effective when re-
corded.'0 8 And the California courts had held that a subsequent judgment
lien merged with the attachment lien and related back to the time when the
attachment was recorded.1 9 Since the federal tax lien came after the attach-
ment lien, the state court relegated the Government to the funds remaining
after discharge of Morrison's judgment.110
The Government appealed, and the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The federal tax lien had become affixed before Morrison's judgment. A state
court had once, in a different context, characterized an attachment lien as
contingent:"' if judgment is rendered for the defendant or if the attachment
711, 714 (W.D. Ky. 1943) ; Brenner v. Patrician Restaurant, Inc., 92 N.Y.S2d 246, 243
(N.Y. City Ct 1949). But occasionally the additional argument was accepted by courts
that were confused by Supreme Court interpretation of 3466. See, e.g., United States v.
Barndollar & Crosbie, Inc., 166 F2d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Reese,
131 F2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942); Ratner-Stanhope Corp. v. Rosen, 49 N.Y.S2d 750, 752
(Sup. Ct. 1944); cf. In re Capital Foundry Corp., 64 F. Supp. 885 (E.D.N.Y. 194().
106. See quotation from the Government's brief in Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925,
928 (8th Cir. 1950). For earlier references to less refined versions of the argument, see,
e.g., In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808, 809-10 (6th Cir. 194S); United
States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Board of Supervisors v. Hart, 210
La. 78, 86, 26 So.2d 361, 363 (1946) ; Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Sobel, 175 Misc. 1O,±7,
1069, 26 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146-7 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940) ; United States v. Yates. 204 S.W2d
399, 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; see Martin, C.J., dissenting in Glenn v. American Surety
Co., 160 F.2d 977, 982-3 (6th Cir. 1947). The Government lost in all of these cases.
107. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
108. CAl. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 542a (Deering 1949). Such a lien is found in many states.
DRAKE, ATrAcHMENT § 239 (7th ed. 1891) ; MooRE & CouNTRYmAN, DEmx'i' ,m Crumi-
TORS' RIGHTS-CASES AND MATERIaLS 47 n.6 (1951).
109. See, e.g., Balzano v. Traeger, 93 Cal. App. 640, 643, 270 Pac. 249, 250 (1928).
110. Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal. App.2d 603, 209 P2d 657 (1949), petition for hcar-
fig before Cal. Sup. Ct. denied, 93 Cal. App. 2d 615, 209 P.2d 657 (1949). Under state
law no subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer could have defeated the attaching credi-
tor's right. M1artinovich v. Marsicano, 150 Cal. 597, 89 Pac. 333 (197); W,,Vecd%,ard v.
Brown, 119 Cal. 283, 306, 51 Pac. 2, 9 (1897) ; Porter v. Pico, 55 Cal. 165 (1& D) ; Ritter
v. Scannell, 11 Cal. 238 (1858)..
111. Puissegur v. Yarbrough, 29 Cal.2d 409, 412, 175 P2d 830, 831 (1946). The
Court disregarded the lower California court's determination in the very case under re-
view that the attachment lien was "perfected." Winther v. Murrison, 93 Cal. App.2d 03,
611, 209 P.2d 657, 659 (1949).
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lien is allowed to lapse by the passage of time, the attachment lien is dis-
solved.11 2 In that sense, Morrison's attachment lien was inchoate.113 Con-
sequently, the Government argued that since the priority of the United States
under Section 3466 would not be defeated by a lien like Morrison's, the tax
lien should fare no worse. And, although the tax lien statute does not sub-
ordinate or even mention inchoate liens, the Court accepted the Government's
analogy to 3466.114
Since the Supreme Court had not yet found any antedating lien sufficiently
specific and perfected to defeat the federal priority, the Security Bank case
appeared to be a significant victory for the Government. Thirty cases in the
lower courts had denied the supremacy of the 3670 tax lien over antedating
rival liens without investigating inchoateness. 1 ; In applying the rule "first
112. CAL. CODE CIv. Paoc. § 542b (Deering 1949). Since the three-year period had
passed without any enforcement of the lien in Puissegur v. Yarbrough, supra note 111,
the rights of the attaching creditor were terminated by operation of law. Few liens are
not subject to the same kind of contingency.
113. The Government suggested additional respects in which the attachment lien
should be regarded as contingent or inchoate: (1) the attaching creditor has no posses-
sory rights in the property; (2) he has no title; (3) he has no priority over an antedating
unrecorded mortgage; (4) his lien terminates if the debtor dies before levy of execution
on a judgment; (5) his lien right may be displaced by the debtor's declaration of home-
stead before judgment; (6) the attachment lien may be discharged on the debtor's giving
security. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 37-8, United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank,
340 U.S. 47 (1950). A comparable catalogue of contingencies can be drawn up for most
liens. Cf. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 356-7 (1945).
114. "In cases involving a kindred matter [the § 3466 priority] ... , it has never been
held sufficient to defeat the federal priority merely to show a lien effective to protect the
lienor against others than the Government, but contingent upon taking subsequent steps
for enforcing it .... If the purpose of the ... collection of taxes due the United States
from tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail here." United States
v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950). Mr. Justice Jackson concurred
separately. Id. at 51-3. He read the history of the federal tax lien to give the lien priority
over every adverse interest except those protected by notice-filing, and stated that since
an attachment lienor was not "a judgment creditor in the conventional sense," he was not
entitled to protection. Id. at 52. Jackson's history left out significant events, e.g., the
special efforts of Congress, 15 STAT. 125, 128 (1868), to create a lien for the distilled spirits
tax with a first priority identical with that which any tax would have under Jackson's
view of the general tax lien.
115. Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1950) (county tax liens); In re
Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948) (mechanic's lien) ; United States
v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947) (contingent right of setoff); United States v.
Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946) (corporate franchise tax lien) ; American Surety
Co. v. City of Louisville Mun. Housing Comm'n, 63 F. Supp. 486, 487 (W.D. Ky. 1945),
aff'd sub non. Glenn v. American Surety Co., 160 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1947) (equitable
lien of surety) ; United States v. Bank of Shelby, 68 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1934) (banker's
equitable lien or right of setoff) ; In re Fisher Plastics Corp., 89 F. Supp. 446 (D. Mass.
1950) (lien of trustee in bankruptcy) ; United States v. 52.11 Acres of Land, 73 F. Supp.
820 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (garnishment lien) ; United States v. O'Dell, 61 F. Supp. 966, 968
(E.D. Mich. 1945, aft'd on other groinds, 160 F.2d 304, 306-7 (6th Cir. 1947) (city,
county, and state tax liens) ; New York Casualty Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473 (N.D.
Ill. 1944) (equitable lien of surety); In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Ky. 1943)
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in time, first in right," these courts had treated the federal tax lien the same
as any other legal lien having no special priority. 110 Since none of these cases
was brought to the Court's attention in any brief, or mentioned in the opinion,
the Court may not have realized how far Security Bank departed from the
traditional interpretation of 3670."17
In any event, the Government encountered obdurate resistance in its efforts
to exploit the implications of Securi y Bank.118 In spite of the seemingly un-
(same); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. loore, 29 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Ill. 1939) (assign-
ment of shares of stock to secure loan) ; Exchange Nat. Bank of Tulsa v. Davy, 13 F.
Supp. 226 (N.D. Okla. 1936) (assignment creating lien on equitable estate); In re Mt.
Jessup Coal Co., Ltd., 7 F. Supp. 603, 606 (M.D. Pa. 1934) (local tax lien); Winston-
Salem v. Powell Paving Co., 7 F. Supp. 424 (I.D.N.C. 1934) (same); It. re Holmes
Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 239 (D. Conn. 1927) (liens of receiver's certificates) ; In re Caswell
Const. Co., 13 F.2d 667 (N.D.N.Y. 1926) (mechanics liens); The River Queen, 3 F2d
426 (E.D. Va. 1925) (liens for seamen and materialmen); In re Wyley Co., 292 Fed. 90J
(N.D. Ga. 1923) (state tax liens) ; Mfuhleman & Kayhoe, Inc. v. Brown, 43 Del. 207, 45
A.2d 521 (Super. Ct. 1945) (equitable pledge) ; Ferris v. Chic-Alint Gum Co., 14 Del.
Ch. 232, 124 Atl. 577 (1924) (local tax liens) ; Schmitz v. Stockman, 151 Kan. 891, 101
P.2d 962 (1940) (statutory lien of landlord) ; Board of Supervisors v. Hart, 210 La. 78,
26 So.2d 361 (1946) (attachment lien) ; Regan v. Metroptlitan Haulage Co., 127 N.J. Eq.
487, 14 A2d 257 (Ch. 1940) (garagekeeper's lien) ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Triborough Bridge Auth., 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d Z76 (1947) (equitable lien of surety) ;
Knight v. Knight, 272 App. Div. 499, 71 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1st Dep't 1947), off'd, 297 N.Y.
945, 80 N.E.2d 344 (1948) (assignment of percentage of wages) ; Cranford Co. v. L Leo-
pold & Co., 189 Misc. 38, 70 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Sup. CL 1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 754, 75
N.Y.S.2d 512 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 676, 82 N.E2d SO (1943) (mechanic's lien) ;
First National Bank v. Southland Production Co., 1S9 Okla. 9, 17-18, 112 P2d 1037, 1695.6
(1941) (state tax lien securing unascertained amount) ; State v. Wynne, 134 Tex. 455, 133
S.W2d 951 (1939) (state tax liens) ; United States v. Yates, 204 S.W2d 399, 405 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947) (attachment lien and recorded mechanics' liens).
116. The federal tax lien prevailed over a nonfederal lien when the federal lien was
prior in time. See, e.g., Cobb v. United States, 172 F.2d 277, 278-9 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F2d 963, 966 (4th Cir. 1941) ; Littlestown Nat.
Bank. v. Penn Tile Works Co., 352 Pa. 233, 42 A.2d 606 (1945). When the federal lien
was not prior in time, it failed to prevail over a nonfederal lien. See ecases cited note 115
supra.
For holders of interests specifically protected by notice-filing provisions, the federal
tax lien has been treated as not arising until duly perfected under § 3672 by the filing 'f
notice. See, e.g., United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F2d 610 (3d Cir. 1933); In
re F. MacKinnon Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1928).
The rule of "first in time, first in right" has been applied to the federal estate tax lien.
INT. rv. CODE § 27(a) ; Paul v. United States, 127 F.2d 64, 66 (6th Cir. 1942), aff'd
sub now. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, and Michigan v. United States,
317 U.S. 338 (1943) ; United States v. Security-First Nat. Banl,, 30 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.
Cal. 1939), appeal dis-misscd, 113 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1940); In r, Dcchers Estate, 355
Pa. 331, 49 A2d 714 (1946), cert. denied .sb nom. Decker v. Kann, 331 U.S. 207 (19471.
117. The law reviews generally caught the latent signficance of the decision. 35
MINNx. L. REv. 580 (1951) ; 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 373 (1951); Note, 29 N. C. L RE%. 293
(1951) ; 39 GEo. L.J. 496 (1951).
118. See, e.g., United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 2101 F2d 118 (10h
Cir. 1952), sustaining priority of a surety's equitable lien uvcr the Guvernment's lien,
notwithstanding a contingency as to the surety's obligaton when the tax lien attached;
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attainable standards for the specific and perfected lien erected by Supreme
Court opinions construing Section 3466, lower courts bad little difficulty in
finding these standards satisfied by liens competing with a federal tax lien.110
They also avoided Security Bank by characterizing state-created interests in
such a way as to bring their owners within the protection of the notice-filing
provision.120 In Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 21 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court used both devices to sustain the superiority of town property
tax liens over subsequent 3670 tax liens: (1) the town's tax liens were held
specific and perfected; (2) the town, by virtue of the assessment of taxes, was
a judgment creditor under previous state decisions and, as such, was entitled
to the protection of notice-filing. The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, disagreed on both points.' 22 The first ground failed because the town
lacked possession or title.123 The second ground failed because only a judg-
United States v. Anders Contracting Co., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 700 (W.D. S.C. 1953), sustain-
ing an unrecorded conditional sale as against the Government's tax lien; In re Ann
Arbor Brewing Co., 110 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Mich. 1951), resolving conflicts among
local, state, and federal tax liens without reference to the Security Bank case;
United States v. Griffin-Moore Lumber Co., 62 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1953), sustaining superior-
ity of prior-in-time materialman's lien. In Gulf Coast Marine Ways, Inc. v. The J. R.
Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379, 385 (S.D. Tex. 1952), the asserted priority of a federal tax
lien was denied on the ground that another federal statute extended priority to "preferred
maritime liens." 41 STAT. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1946) (Ship Mortgage Act).
Maritime liens have traditionally been accorded superiority over nonmaritime liens without
reference to the chronology of their accrual. RoINsoN, ADmIRALTY § 60 (1939) ; Note,
35 YALE L.J. 876 (1926).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.
1953), cert. granted, 22 U.S.L. WEK 3307 (U.S. 1954) (garnishment lien) ; United States
v. Albert Holman Lumber Co., 206 F.2d 685 (5th Cir.), rehearing dcnied, 208 F.2d 113
(1953) (materialmen's liens) ; United States v. Acri, 109 F. Supp, 943 (N.D. Ohio 1952),
aff'd, 209 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 22 U.S.L. W=zx 3307 (U.S. 1954)
(attachment lien); Great American Indemnity Co. v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 445
(W.D. La. 1954) (statutory liens for laborers and materialmen) ; American Fidelity Co. v.
Delaney, 114 F. Supp. 702 (D. Vt. 1953) (equitable lien of surety against sum held by
obligee of construction bond); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Lovell, 108 F. Supp. 360,
368 (S.D. Miss. 1952) (lien of creditor's bill) ; United States v. Canadian American Co.,
108 F. Supp. 206, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (local tax lien); Levy v. Tubby's Wine & Liquor
Shop Inc., 110 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. City Ct. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 116 N.Y.S,2d
207 (1st Dep't 1952) (local tax liens; Security Bank ignored). In none of these cases
did the lienor competing with the Government appear to have "perfected" his lien by
divesting the debtor of possession or title.
120. Hawkins v. Savage, 110 F. Supp. 615 (D. Alaska 1953) (treating attachment
creditor as a bona fide purchaser) ; Exeter Banking Co. v. Sleeper, 97 N.H. 321, 87 A.2d
151 (1952) (sustaining equitable interest as a mortgage); United States v. Scovil, 78
S.E.2d 277 (S.C. 1953), cert. granted, 22 U.S.L. WEx 3307 (U.S. 1954) (treating land-
lord's lien perfected by distraint as entitled to protection against unfiled tax lien). The
amendments to § 3672 in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 restrict this method of
avoiding Security Bank. See note 104 supra.
121. 97 N.H. 411, 90 A.2d 499 (1952).
122. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
123. The loose usage that has characterized the Court's employment of the terms
"specific," "general," "inchoate," and "perfected" appears with glaring clarity in Gilbert
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ment creditor "in the usual, conventional sense" is comprehended within the
restricted list of beneficiaries of notice-filing m4
Despite the Government's victory, Gilbert Associates casts doubt on Securi-
ty Bank's application of the doctrine of the general and inchoate lien to Sec-
tion 3670 cases. Since the debtor was in receivership, the Government asserted
both a 3670 tax lien and a 3466 priorityYm  If, as Security Bank indicated,
the doctrine is engrafted on 3670, the Court could have held for the Govern-
ment on both grounds. But the Court based its decision solely on the Govern-
ment's 3466 priority,r '3 revealing perhaps a sense of insecurity about Security
Bank. In any event, the lethal effects of the doctrine were mitigated in
United States v. New Britai,127 where the Supreme Court found a specific
and perfected lien for the first time.
New Britain presented the logically insoluble puzzle of liens caught in a
circuity, of priority. 2 8 Federal tax liens were inferior to two mortgages and
a judgment lien, which had attached before notice of the federal liens was
filed; but the federal tax liens were superior to subsequent city liens, for taxes
and water charges. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors sawv nothing
Associates. No defect in the town's lien was suggested other than its failure to reduce
the property to possession. This single deficiency, however, sufficed to render the lien both
"general" and "inmperfected." Id. at 366.
124. Id. at 364. And see note 104 supra.
125. After lower courts and commentators had expressed considerable doubt about
the applicability of Section 3466 to tax claims, the Supreme Court settled the question in
the affirmative. Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
126. The Court inadvertently included a dictum in its originally filed opinion that
if only the federal lien statute were involved, "priority would depend upon the dates the
liens arose." United States v. Gilbert Associates, 73 Sup. Ct. 704 (ad'. op., 1953). The
dictum was deleted in the official report. But the dictum was relied on in United States
x. Albert Holman Lumber Co., 206 F2d 685, 689 (5th Cir. 1953). When the deletion vas
called to the attention of the Fifth Circuit in a petition for rehearing, it amended its
opinion but adhered to its original decision. 203 F.2d 113.
127. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
128. The circuity problem was also present in United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 4S0
(1941). The proceeds of the sale of the debtor's property in the hands of the receiver
were insufficient to pay any one of the rival claimants-United States, state, or mort-
gagee-in full. The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the provision of the Texas stat-
ute making the occupation tax on gasoline "a preferred lien, first and prior to any and all
other existing liens . .. regardless of the time such liens originated," was constitutional
and must be given effect. State v. Nix, 134 Tex. 476, 133 S.WV2d 963 (1939). Accord-
ingly the mortgages were subordinated to the state's lien. And since the federal priority
could not be ranked above the state's lien without nullifying the state statute, nor above
the mortgage without -violating federal law, the Government was relegated to the third
rung. 138 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Since only the Government sought United
States Supreme Court review of the state court determination in favor of the Texas tax
lien, the Court declined to decide the relative rights of the mortgagee as against the
Government. On remand, the Texas court saw no alternative tu turning over the entire
proceeds to the United States, thus freezing out the prior mortgage. State v. Nix, 159
SAV.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). The court, however, could have followed federal
policy, finding the mortgage superior to the federal priority, but appropriating the funds
set aside for the mortgage to the pa)ment of the state tax lien.
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in the Security Bank case requiring disregard of the "principle ordinarily ap-
plicable to the determination of priority of incumbrances, namely, first in order
of time, first in right.' 2' But it found it impossible to apply the ordinary rule
in the circuity situation presented, because under Connecticut law the mort-
gages and the judgment lien were inferior to the city's liens. A disposition
which would prefer the federal tax liens to those of the city would violate
state law if the order of distribution were (1) mortgages and judgment lien,
(2) federal liens, (3) city liens; or would violate federal law if the order
were (1) federal liens, (2) city liens, (3) mortgages and judgment lien. The
solution of the Connecticut court was to find a congressional intent to sub-
ordinate federal liens not only to mortgages and judgment liens but also to
other encumbrances superior to mortgages and judgment liens. 180 Accord-
ingly, it approved distribution of the proceeds in the following order: (1) city
liens, (2) mortgages and judgment lien, (3) federal liens.
The Government appealed, challenging the rule of "first in time, first in
right." The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, but vacated the Connecti-
cut judgment because the rule had not been applied.131 The Court suggested
that the United States was not concerned with the relative priority among
the city, the mortgagee, and the judgment creditor, provided that the Govern-
ment's claim was subordinated only to an amount equal to the claims of the
mortgagee and judgment creditor. 13 2 Impliedly, on remand the state court
may follow state policy and appropriate the funds set aside by the Supreme
Court for the mortgagee and judgment creditor to the payment of the city
liens.18 3 Such an allocation, however, would violate the federal policy of pro-
tecting the mortgagee and judgment creditor from the impact of 3670.
Although the Government did not defeat the city liens, the doctrine of the
inchoate and general lien still survives. The Government relied on Security
Bank and Gilbert Associates to defeat all the city liens. The Court accepted
Security Bank's application of the doctrine to 3670 litigation. 18 4 But it dis-
129. Brown v. General Laundry Service, Inc., 139 Conn. 363, 372, 94 A.2d 10, 14
(1952).
130. Id. at 374, 94 A.2d at 15, citing Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch. 232,
124 AtI. 577 (1924).
131. 347 U.S. 81, 85-6 (1.954).
132. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 88 (1954).
133. The Government suggested that the problem of circuity could be solved by set-
ting aside enough of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to pay the mortgage liens and
the judgment before satisfying the Government. The priority of the city could then be
preserved by paying its liens from the sum so set apart. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 17,
United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). The resulting disposition would com-
pel the mortgagee and judgment creditor, who are explicitly protected as against the
United States by § 3672, to submit to a compression of their liens between those of the
city and the United States. To the extent of the city's liens denied priority over the
federal liens, the mortgagee and the judgment creditor would thus be postponed to both
the federal liens and the city's liens. The Government obliquely acknowledged the in-
congruity but blamed it on the state law.
134. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954).
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tinguished the result in that case on the ground that Security Bank involved
an inchoate lien, while in New Britain "certain of the city's tax and water-rent
liens apparently attached to the specific property and became choate prior to
the attachment of the federal tax liens."'13 The Court's distinction between
Gilbert Associates and New Britain, however, is an uneasy one. New Britain's
liens were not accompanied by possession or title, and that had been fatal to
the to-n's claim to a specific and perfected lien in Gilbert Associates. Never-
theless, Gilbert Associates was distinguished because it involved "personal
property" and an insolvent taxpayer, and because the town's lie was general
while New Britain's was specific.' 30 However, the property subject to the lien
in Gilbert Associates was real property under state law,137 and the New
Hampshire court, with as much justification as the Connecticut court, had
held the town's lien to be specific.
The road from Spokane Count ' to Ncw Britain was built without the aid
of Congress. Originally the Government had a 3466 priority among unsecured
creditors and an ordinary lien for tax claims under 3670. Both the federal
priority and the tax lien were construed to respect the integrity of pre-existing
liens. The detour in Spokane County destroyed this harmony by introducing
the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien into 34456, giving the Government
the extraordinary status of an unsecured creditor capable of superseding prior
liens that are not specific and perfected.' 38 Parallel construction was restored
when Security Bank applied the doctrine to the 3670 tax lien and thereby
gave the tax lien superiority over antedating inchoate and general liens.'3 0
But the two cases following Sceurity Bank have put a new fork in the road:
the criteria for determining specificity and perfection of a rival lien may not
be the same under 3466 and 3670. The Supreme Court's election to rest its
decision in Gilbert Associates on the 3466 priority and not on a 3670 lien
suggests that the less specific claim created by Section 3466 is once again
more efficacious than Section 3670 in competition with other liens.140 And
the Court's failure to note the lack of title or possession in New Britain's
lien, when this shortcoming was fatal to the town's lien in Gilbert Associates,
confirms the impression that standards of specificity and perfection are more
easily met by a competing lien under 3670 than under 3466. Moreover, the
135. Id. at 86-7.
136. Id. at 87.
137. Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N.H. 411, 414, 9D A2d 499, 501 (1952).
138. And because the Court has not yet found a specific and perfected lien in a 3465
case, it has said that it has not answered the question whether even a specific and pzr-
fected lien would prevail over the federal priority. See notes 27, 58 sispro.
139. Except the three which Congress expressly saved by the notice-filing provision:
the mortgage, pledge, and judgment lien. INr. REv. CoDE § 3672.
140. The Court's contrast of the "absolute priority" when the debtor is insolvent with
the failure of Congress "to expressly provide for federal priority" in the absence of in-
solvency also suggests that the Court thinks of 3466 as the more powerful preference.
United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 87 (1954).
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three interests expressly protected from a 3670 lien-the mortgage, judgment
lien, and pledge-may be unable to withstand the 3466 priority.141
THE BANKRUPTCY ACT: CONGRESSIONAL SIGNPOST ON THE PRIORITY ROAD
The disparity between the treatment of federal claims in bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy liquidations 142 reveals how far the doctrine of the inchoate
lien has led the courts astray. The Bankruptcy Act is equipped with its own
system of priorities among unsecured creditors. 148 Federal, state, and local tax
141. While Government counsel have sometimes conceded the validity of mortgages
antedating the attachment of the 3466 priority, these concessions have generally been
arguendo; the record is replete with their efforts, ancient and recent, to subvert mortgage
liens under 3466. See Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 386, 421 et seq. (U.S. 1828) ;
United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73, 82-3 (U.S. 1805) ; United States v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 33 F.2d 533, 536-7 (8th Cir. 1929), aff'd, 280 U.S. 478 (1930).
In Meyer Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A.2d 210 (1946), the Government, having a
tax lien, sought to prevail over a prior judgment lien by invoking the 3466 priority as
elaborated by the inchoate lien doctrine. By a process of reasoning which comes close to
reversing the rationale of Gilbert Associates, the court ruled that § 3672 limits § 3466,
thereby saving the judgment lien. Accord: In re Decker Estate, 355 Pa. 331, 49 A.2d 714
(1.946), cert. denied sub nor. Decker v. Kann, 331 U.S. 807 (1947).
Since the Supreme Court in United States v. Gilbert Associates went to the trouble of
denying that the town was a judgment creditor under § 3672, it has been suggested that
the Court is ready to hold that a judgment creditor along with the other persons listed in
§ 3672 is entitled to prevail against the § 3466 priority. See Note, 22 GEO. WAs n. L. REv.
583, 590 (1954).
142. See Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy
and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARV. L. REV. 251, 276 (1929).
143. BANKRUPTCY Acr § 64a. See 3 COLLzR, BANKRUPTCY U 64.502 (14th ed. 1941)
for a discussion of the limited role of § 3466 in bankruptcy proceedings. Section 3466 may
apply, however, in reorganization proceedings under § 77 and Chapter X. See 5 id. 1 77.21
(14th ed. 1.943) ; 6 id. 19.13[2] (14th ed. 1947).
In situations where the question is whether a particular debtor enterprise should be
permitted to continue rather than be liquidated, Congress has taken into account the
peculiar position of the Government as an inevitable future creditor. In railroad reorgani-
zations, corporate reorganizations generally, and real property arrangements, the debtor's
property shall be free and clear of all claims, including liens, of creditors except such as
may otherwise be provided for in the plan or appropriate judicial order. See BANKRUPrcY
Act §§ 77(f), 226, and 474. But to protect the interests of the United States as a tax and
customs-duty collector, Congress has prohibited confirmation of any plan of reorganiza-
tion or arrangement -not providing for full payment of any claims the Government holds
in such a capacity, unless a designated official or agency of the United States accepts a
lesser amount. See id. §§ 77(e), 199, and 455.
Likewise, by § 337(2), the debtor in a Chapter XI proceeding for an arrangement is
required to deposit enough money to pay debts having priority under Section 64a, includ-
ing taxes and debts owing the United States, unless the United States shall waive such
deposit. Chapter XIII, authorizing wage earners' plans for composition or extension,
requires full payment of debts entitled to priority under § 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, in-
cluding federal tax claims. BANKRUPTCY ACT § 659.
Cf. ip re Rider, 40 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Iowa 1941), subordinating federal priority to
a mortgage lien on rents and profits in a proceeding under § 75s of the Bankruptcy Act.
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claims are on the fourth of a five-rung ladder of priority.4 4 Section 3466, a
priority created by a law of the United States, is on the fifth rung. 4 5 In
bankruptcy proceedings, the Government can assert no priority over state
or local bodies for unsecured tax claims,' "16 and all such claims are ranked
below the three rungs of administrative costs and expenses, wages, and certain
creditors' expenses. And Government nontax claims on the fifth rung are
further subordinated to state and local tax claims on the fourth rung. More-
over, the bankruptcy priorities among unsecured creditors are not honored
until lien creditors have been satisfied. 147
And the Bankruptcy Act is more solicitous toward inchoate and general
liens than the Supreme Court has been in nonbankruptcy proceedings. The
Chandler Act of 1938 favored the inchoate and general statutory lien: these
liens may be perfected after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and when
perfected, they must be paid in full before all unsecured claims, including
those of the Government. 48 In the situations in which statutory liens may
not be perfected, or their holders are limited in the amount of preferred re-
covery,1 9 the Government is an incidental rather than an intended beneficiary.
These restrictions were intended primarily to protect all general creditors from
state-created liens thought to bear similarity to the state-created priorities that
had been nullified for bankruptcy purposes by the Chandler Act.L'G
If the policy of the Bankruptcy Act is sound, it should be followed in other
144. BA rxaryc- Acr § 64a(4).
145. BAZKRUTcY Acr § 64a(5); In re Well, 39 F. Supp. 618 (M.D. Pa. 1941); 3
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 164.502 (14th ed. 1941). In asserting priority under § 64a(5) the
Government must of course establish that all of the requirements for the applicability of
3466 have been met.
146. See Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 74 (1936).
147. City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174 (1919); United States v. SampZell,
153 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Auto Electric Repair & Parts Co,, 41 F. Supp.
3, 4 (W.D. Ky. 1941); 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 64.02 (14th ed. 1941); 4 id. 67.20
(14th ed. rev. 1954).
The Government thus has been unable to exploit the Spokane line of cases in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. It tried vithout success in United States v. Sampsell, 153 F2d 731,
734 (9th Cir. 1946) ; it re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F7d 979, 932 (9th Cir. 1939) ;
In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711, 714 (W.D. Ky. 1943). It succeeded in United States
v. Reese, 131 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942), where the court displayed an amazing disregard of
statutory limitations. Cf. In rc Capital Foundry Corp., 64 F. Supp. 8,5 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
-148. BANaKRupTcv AcT § 67(b). This section was designed to codify preexisting lar.
4 Co.LIE BAN RupTcy 67.2012] (14th ed. rev. 1954); HJ :xA & MAcLAcaL,,:, TnE
BAxrRuPTcy Acr oF 1893 wrrH ANxorATI0,oS 96 (5th ed. 1953); cf. In re Knox-
Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F2d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1939) (applying pre-Chandler Act bank-
ruptcy law to sustain inchoate state tax liens as against a federal priority claim) ; New
Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F-2d 399, 400-2 (5th Cir. 1943) (discussing the e.\tent to which
§ 67b codified prior law).
149. Bankruptcy Act § 67c limits recovery on wage and rent liens to the same extent
that § 64a limits wage and rent priorities, and invalidates against the trustee state statu-
tory liens on an insolvent debtor's personalty unless accompanied by possession or levy.
150. See I-.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952).
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liquidations involving federal claims.15 1 The argument for elimination of the
disparity between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy distributions involves more
than an academic concern for theoretical consistency. 15 2 Bankruptcy legis-
lation reflects a deliberate congressional choice not to accord the federal prior-
ity the kind of treatment which the Supreme Court has said is necessary to
insure prompt and certain collection of debts due to the United States.153
Judicial legislation is not only arbitrary in this sense, but it also tends to in-
crease the number of bankruptcy petitions at the instance of creditors who
fare better under the bankruptcy rules of distribution. -'And when bankruptcy
is not available, 5 4 the spectacle of liquidations proceeding side by side--one
affording the Government priority over liens as well as unsecured claims, and
the other denying such priority-defies rational justification for the discrimi-
nation.
CONCLUSION
There is little reason to hope that the Supreme Court will retreat from the
position it has taken in respect to the Section 3466 priority or, indeed, that it
will not continue to extend the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien to
envelop all liens in nonbankruptcy liquidations of insolvent estates. The 3466
priority must be amended 155 to remove the excrescence of the inchoate and
general lien and to restore the original legislative intent, except insofar as
congressional policy has been modified by relevant provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. A statute which would effectuate these objectives follows:
FEDERAL PRIORITY
Section I. Priority established: When an insolvent debtor of the United
States is divested of the title, possession, or both title and possession of
151. See Rogge, supra note 142, at 276.
152. See Glenn v. American Surety Co., 160 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1947) (dissent-
ing opinion) ; Regan v. Metropolitan Haulage Co., Inc., 127 N.J. Eq. 487, 489-90, 14 A.2d
257, 258 (Ch. 1940).
153. For a description of the process of degradation of the tax priority in bankruptcy
as federal tax claims have assumed increasing size and signficance, see Wurzel, Taxation
During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HARV. L. Rav. 1141, 1145-7 (1942). See also 3 CoL-
LiER, BANKRUPTCY 64.402 (14th ed. 1941.) ; Notes, 56 YALE L.J. 1258, 1263-4 (1947) and
36 YALE L.J. 138 (1926). Cf. Lord Atkinson in Food Controller v. Cork, [1923] A. C.
647, 659.
154. E.g., in the case of an insolvent decedent's estate. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 4.07
(14th ed. 1940).
155. Two identical bills to amend § 3466 have been introduced in the 83d Congress,
1st Session. H.R. 77 and H.R. 3699. These bills have the limited purpose "to subordinate
tax claims of the United States to wage claims in state insolvency proceedings," and draw
to some extent on the language of the wage priority provision of the Bankruptcy Act,
§ 64a(2).
As a result of recent hearings conducted on the so-called Langer Bills, S. 2560, S. 2561,
S. 2562, and S.2563, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), Jacob I. Weinstein, Esq., of the Phila-
delphia bar and former chairman of the National Bankruptcy Conference, was requested
to draft a measure limiting tax claims so as to assure priority to wage claims. 28 J.N.A.
REP. BANR. 42 (1954).
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all, or substantially all, of his property for the purpose of effecting gen-
eral administration for the benefit of creditors otherwise than in bank-
ruptcy,'xz the claims of the United States shall be entitled to priority
of payment, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) Certain Liens Preserved: Except as provided in Section II,
nothing herein shall impair any valid lien acquired before such divestment.
(2) Administrative Expenses: Expenses of collecting, preserving,
and distributing the debtor's property shall be a first charge against tile
property administered. 157
(3) Wage Claints: Claims against the debtor for wages due to
workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city salesmen on salary or
commission basis, whole or part time, whether or not selling exclusively
for the debtor, shall be paid before the claims of the United States; but
in no event shall such priority extend to earnings for any period over three
months before divestment of the debtor's property in the manner provided
in this Section, nor to any amount in excess of $600 for each wage
claimant.15 8
(4) State and Local Taxes: Taxes legally due and owing by the
debtor to any state or subdivision shall be accorded equal priority vith
taxes legally due and owing to the United States and shall be paid before
any claims of the United States for other than taxes.1 9
(5) Claims for Rent: Claims for rent to the extent of that legally due
for actual use and occupancy during the three months before divestment
of the debtor's property in the manner provided in this section shall, if
entitled to priority under state law, be accorded equal priority with
claims of the United States for other than taxes. 00
(6) Rule in Bankruptcy: This section is a law of the United States
entitling the United States to priority within the meaning of the Batik-
ruptcy Act, and in proceedings under that Act the claims of the United
States shall have the degree of priority therein specified.
Section II. Certain Liens Postponed: Any statutory lien on personal
property unaccompanied by possession, sequestration, or distraint of, or
levy upon, such property, and any lien of distress for rent for an amount
in excess of that legally due and owing for actual use and occupancy
during the three months before divestment of the debtor's property in
156. This clause describes the cases to which the federal priority statute has pre-
viously been held to apply.
157. This subsection finds a parallel in §64a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act. Authori-
tative interpretation of the priority statute now recognizes the priority of such expenses.
See, e.g., Kennebec Box Co. v. 0. S. Richards Corp., 5 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1925); In re
Holmes Mfg. Co., 19 F2d 239 (D. Conn. 1927).
158. This provision of course departs completely from § 3466. It follows closely the
language as well as policy of § 64a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. See also, H.R. 77 and
H.R. 3699, supra note 155, and the proposed revision of § 3466 in Rogge, stpra note 142,
at 277.
159. This subsection conforms to the policy of § 64a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. See
also, Rogge, stpra note 142, at 276. It gives no priority to state taxes except in a case
to which the section applies, i.e., when an insolvent debtor of the United States is divested
of his property.
160. This provision brings § 3466 in harmony with § 64a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act.
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the manner provided by this section shall be postponed to claims entitled
to priority under Section 1.161
Section III. Liability of the Liquidator: Every executor, administrator,
assignee, or other person who knowingly 102 pays, in whole or in part,
any claim against the debtor for whom he acts before he pays the claims
of the United States having priority thereto tinder the preceding sections
shall be answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of such
payments for the claims so owing the United States, or for so much
thereof as may remain due and unpaid.10 3
Section IV. Definitions:
(1) Decedent's Estate: A decedent's estate shall be deemed to be the
property of a debtor who has been divested of all his property for the
purpose of general administration at the moment of his death.
10 4
(2) Insolvent Debtor: A debtor shall be deemed insolvent whenever
the property of which he has been divested in the manner provided in
Section I is insufficient to pay all his debts.103
(3) Claims: "Claims" shall be those found to be legally due and
owing by the debtor as of the date of the divestment of his property
in the manner prescribed in Section I.100
161. This provision adopts the policy of § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act-invalidating
floating liens-but extends it somewhat in respect to federal and perhaps state tax liens
on personalty. If, as the legislative explanation indicates, H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1952), the target of the 1952 change in §67c was "'floating liens,' which
attach to all a debtor's personalty, although the property he owns is commonly chang-
ing from day to day," no more perfect example can be found than the federal tax lien.
The failure to include the federal lien in § 67c may be explained by the fact that the 1952
amendment was intended to include only "non-controversial" measures. Duberstein, High
lights of Bankruptcy Amendments (1952), 27 J.N.A. REF. BANKR. 21 (1953). Even so,
the Treasury Department objected to certain changes because of their possible impact on
revenue collection. After noting the objections, the House Report accompanying the bill
to amend pointed out that the Government was adequately protected and that its position
was actually bettered. H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, 21 (1952).
In adopting the policy of § 67c, Section II is subject to the criticism that may be
levelled at that bankruptcy provision. Cf. 62 YALE L.J. 1,131, 1134-36 (1953). However,
as long as the policy of subordinating so-called "floating liens" remains a part of the law
governing distribution in bankruptcy, a discrepancy in distribution tnder § 3466 is unwar-
ranted. While the result of application of the proposal here may conform to that reached
in some of the Supreme Court precedents criticized in this article, the amorphous doc-
trine of the inchoate and general lien is replaced by a much more restricted and manage-
able concept. Doubts that now surround many forms of security are removed.
162. The requirement of knowledge is added as a safeguard against harsh application
of the statute. Cf. United States v. Eyges, 286 Fed. 683 (D. Mass. 1923).
163. This provision is substantially the same as that found in S. 685, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951). It does not attempt to impose liability on the liquidator for failing to pay
other claimants in the order of their priority.
164. This provision is intended to make it clear that the comprehensive language of
Section I includes the administration of a decedent's estate.
165. This definition of insolvency conforms to that recognized under § 3466. United
States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923). Cf. BANKRUPTcY AcT §§ 1(19), 67d(1) (d).
166. This fixes a cutoff date consistent with that recognized in the adjudicated cases.
Cf. United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200 (1939).
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The federal tax lien statute should also be amended. As the Supreme Court
recognized in New Britain, congressional policy permits the preference of the
3670 lien to be determined by the principle that "the first in time is the first
in right." However, the decision and rationale in Sccurity Bank constitute a
constant threat to application of this principle. The mischief of the doctrine
of the inchoate and general lien should be removed by adopting a test of
perfection 16 7 similar to that which has worked so well in bankruptcy.10s The
Government would then be treated like other lienors. This is the traditional
philosophy of Section 3670.169
167. E.g., "Prior Liens Preserved: Nothing herein shall be construed to invalidate
or postpone the rights of any third person, including a State or a subdivision thereof,
which have attached to property before the lien provided in Section 3670 arises, and which
are recognized by the law of the State or Territory %-here the property is situated as
being effective against any subsequent lien thereon obtainable through judicial proceedings
by a creditor of the tax delinquent."
168. See H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 7 (1949); 4 CouaTn, BA-m,,-
Ruprc- ff 70.45, 70.47, 70.49, 70.52 (14th ed. 1942).
169. See H.R. RzP. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912).
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